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Notes
A REVIEW 'OF THE DEFENSE OF DRUNKENNESS IN THE
CR1MINAL LAW Until comparatively recently, voluntary drunken-
ness was never an excuse for a crime. In fact, there is authority to
show that some regarded it as an aggravation of the offence., How-
ever, this view met with little success and the prevailing sentiment
was that there were no concessions for drunken wrongdoers.la This
can be explained by the fact that the old English criminal law,
which contained many capital crimes, "would hardly be impressed
by the niceties of mediaeval ethical discrimination concerning in-
ebriates".2 This view of the older law is, perhaps, somewhat harsh as
an explanation. Kenny explained that it was no defense, "for unlike
insanity it had been produced voluntarily, and to produce it was
wrong, both morally and also legally".3
Furthermore, the defense was regarded with suspicion in that it
was feared that the state of drunkenness could be easily feigned or
counterfeited. Others feared that, "There could rarely be a conviction
for homicide if drunkenness avoided responsibility".4 It was felt that
one should not escape the results of his crime by reason of his own
vice and misconduct.5 These views seem to reflect more of an emo-
tional condemnation of the drunkard rather than a reasoned analysis
of its effect on the requisite mental element in a crime.
Both Hall6 and Williams7 discount the fear that the state of
drunkenness would be resorted to by the criminal or one planning to
commit a crime to avoid criminal responsibility. Certainly a normal
person who wished to commit a crime would not want to incapacitate
himself by becoming greatly intoxicated. He would rather attempt to
escape detection than to rely on his drunkenness as an excuse.
Involuntary drunkenness, on the other hand, is a complete de-
fense and this view is probably justified because the older jurists
felt that it was not open to the same abuse as voluntary drunkenness.8
But, Hall in his investigations has found that because the American
judges have stressed that fraud and coercion are necessary to estab-
lish involuntary intoxication, "involuntary intoxication is simply and
LBeverley's Case (1683), 4 Coke 123b at 125; 69 E.R. 1118 at 1122. Coke
regarded drunkenness as an aggravation.la G. Williams, Criminal Law-the General Part (London, Stevens &Sons, 1953), p. 370 footnote 8: "He that kylleth a man drunk, sobur schal be
hangyd."
2 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill, 1960), p. 530; 1st ed. 1947, p. 429.
3Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 16th ed. (Cambridge, University
Press, 1952), p. 50.4 Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th ed. Rochester, Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing Co., 1932), p. 95.
5 Supra footnote 2.6 Ibid.
7 Supra footnote Ia.
8 Supra footnote la at p. 372.
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completely non existent".9 The factual situations of all the reported
cases do not appear to support a single decision where the defendant
was involuntarily intoxicated.' 0 Hall concludes that it is almost neces-
sary for .one to be bound and restrained by force while the intoxicant
is poured into his mouth before he can avail himself of the defense
of involuntary drunkenness.
In the last one hundred and fifty years, the defense of drunken-
ness has involved a consideration of the relation of the state of
drunkenness to the elements of a crime; namely, the actus reus, and
the mens rea. The defense can only be completely understood and
analyzed if considered with regard to these basic elements.
The leading case on the defense of drunkenness is the Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Beard." Here, the defendant, while ravish-
ing a young girl, covered her mouth with his hand to stifle her scream-
ing. In doing so he pressed his thumb on her throat, and as a result,
she died of suffocation. The defendant when charged with murder,
raised the defense of drunkenness. On appeal by the Director of
Public Prosecutions, the House of Lords restored the conviction of
Beard for murder.
Lord Birkenhead L.C., after a comprehensive review of the
cases on the defense of drunkenness, laid down three propositions
which today form the basis of the law on this subject. They are:
"1. That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a
defense to the crime charged.
2. That, evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable
of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be
taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to deter-
mine whether or not he had this intent.
3. That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity
in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and
merely establishing that his mind was so affected by drink so that he
more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the pre-
sumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts."12
The decision is cited most often for the third proposition. It was for
that reason that Beard had no defense to the charge of rape. But,
the situation was further complicated by the fact that death resulted
in the furtherance of a felony, and as a result, there was no need to
show that Beard intended to cause the death of this little girl. All the
prosecution had to show was that death resulted from the commission
of a felony of violence and that he intended to commit that felony.13
Lord Birkenhead L.C. at p. 507 says:
9 Supra footnote 2 at p. 440.
30But see the case of Pearson (1935), 2 Lew. 144; E.R. 1108, where
the accused's companions put alcohol into his ginger beer.
11 [19203 A.C. 479 (H.L.).
12 Bupra footnote 11 at p. 500.
23 This is of especial interest with regard to section 202 of the Criminal
Code.
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"There was no evidence that he was too drunk to form the -intent of
committing rape. Under these circumstances, it was proved that death
was caused by an act of violence done in furtherance of the felony of
rape. Such killing is by the law of England, murder".
Could Beard have pleaded that he was too drunk to intend to
commit rape? It is unlikely, since in the circumstances, drunkenness
"cannot normally negative an intent to rape, for rape cannot normally
be committed unintentionally". 1 4 It can be said that the fact of rape
implies the intention to commit the act, and the felony-murder rule
would then apply.
Lord Birkenhead's three propositions will now be considered.
Over indulgence in alcohol may lead to permanent damage of
the brain tissues which would result in insanity. Such a condition is
known as delirium tremens or alcoholic dementia, and is a condition
in which attacks can recur even when one has not been consuming any
alcohol. Such a disease of the mind if regarded as insanity by the
M'Naghten Rules, now section 16 of the Criminal Code, is a com-
plete answer to any criminal charge. The accused is found not guilty
but insane and is detained at Her Majesty's pleasure in an appropri-
ate institution for the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Be-
cause of the uncertainty in the length of time of such confinement,
the defense of insanity is usually limited to crimes which have the
accused liable to capital punishment.
Originally, only habitual drunkenness causing permanent insanity
was a defense to a crime.1 5 However, in the case of R. v. Davis,1 6
it was held by Stephen J. that temporary insanity caused by drunken-
ness also excuses the accused. His Lordship said:
"But drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness
leads are different things; and if a man by drunkenness brings on a
state of disease which causes such a degree of madness, even for a
time, which would have relieved him from the responsibility if it had
been caused in any other way, then he would not be criminally re-
sponsible. In my opinion, in such a case the man is a madman and is to
be treated as such, although his madness is only temporary".
This view was approved by Lord Birkenhead L.C. in the Beard case.
Because of the serious consequences of the results of a success-
ful plea of insanity, the English practice is that the judge will not
direct the jury on the question of insanity unless the defense is actu-
ally set up by counsel for the defendant.1 7 The Canadian practice
appears to be that if the defense of drunkenness is set up, the judge
is also competent to direct the jury on the question of insanity even
if it is not pleaded as a defense.1 8
14 Supra footnote la at p. 378.1 5 Burrows case (1823), 1 Lewin 75; 168 E.R. 965.
Rennie's case (1825), 1 Lewin 76; 168 E.R. 965.
16 (1881), 14 Cox C.C. 563.
17 D.P.P. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.).
18 P.. v. Garrigan, [1937] 3 W.W.R. 109; 4 D.L.R. 344; 69 C.C.C. 98 (B.C.
C.A.).
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Where a crime has as one of its constituent elements the re-
quirement of a specific intent, the defense of drunkenness can be
used in certain cases to :negative that specific intent. It must be
noted that although drunkenness may negative a specific intent, it
does not necessarily constitute a complete defense to a crime. The
effect may be to find that the accused has sufficient capacity to form
an intent to commit a lesser crime; aggravated assault can be re-
duced to common assault and so on.
The first decision to point out that evidence of drunkenness is
admissible to negative specific intent was the case of R?. v. Monk-
house19 where the accused was indicted for discharging a loaded re-
volver with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Lord Coleridge J. said:
"Drunkenness is ordinarily neither a defense nor an excuse for crime,
and where it is available as a partial answer to the charge, It rests on
the prisoner to prove it, and it is not enough that he was excited or
rendered more irritable, unless the intoxication was such as to prevent
his restraining himself from committing the act in question or to take
away from him the power of forming any specific intention".2 0
Although the prisoner was found guilty, the case is significant
because it recognized the availability of the defense.'
In, R. v. Dohertyin the defense of drunkenness effectively re-
duced murder to manslaughteria by negativing the intent to do
grievous bodily harm. In his charge to the jury, Stephen J. said:
'!As a-rule the use of a knife to stab or a pistol to shoot shows an intent
to do grievous bodily harm, but this is not a necessary Inference." 22(Italics mine).
This view of Stephen J. impliedly overruled the view in R?. V. Meakin23
where it was held that intoxication can have no effect in the con-
sideration of a specific intent to harm in the case of the use of a
dangerous instrument by the accused. Stephen J. went on to say that
drunkenness must be considered in rebutting the presumption that a
man intends the natural consequences of his acts and also that,
"A drunken man may form an intention to kill another, or to do grievous
bodily harm to him, he may not; but if he did form that Intention,
although a drunken intention, he is just as much guilty of murder as If
he had been sober".24
Therefore, His Lordship not only recognized the availability of the
defense but also the fact that it is important evidence going to in-
tention and must be sufficient to negative that intention if it is to
succeed as a defense.
19 (1849), 4 Cox C.C. 55.
2 D Supra footnote 19 at p. 56.
21 (1887), 16 Cox C.C. 306.
21a The defense of drunkenness is of no use in an Indictment for man-
slaughter.2 2 Supra footnote 21 at p. 308.
.23 (1836), 7 Car. & P. 297; 173 E.R. 131.
24 5upra footnote 22.
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There was an attempt to extend the rule in the case of R. v.
Meade25 when Darling J. said that the presumption that man intends
the natural consequences of his acts may be rebutted by showing
the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he was in-
capable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous. It is
readily apparent that this is a significantly wider and different test.
The rule in Meade's Case came under attack in Beard's Case26
where Lord Birkenhead L.C. said:
"the proposition in Meade's Case in its wider interpretation is not, and
cannot be supported by authority. The difficulty has arisen largely be-
cause the Court of Criminal Appeal used language which has been con-
strued as suggesting that the test of the condition of mind of the prisoner
is not whether he was incapable of forming the intent but whether he
was incapable of foreseeing or measuring the consequences of the act
In this respect the so-called rule differs from the direction of Lord Cole-
ridge J., which is more strictly in accordance with the earlier authori-
ties."
The principle can be applied to any crime where particular intent is
required as in the case of Ruse v. Read27 where one who took a bi-
cycle while drunk did not have the required animus furandi to per-
manently deprive the owner of it.28 This case was followed in R. v.
Kindon29 where a woman, who, while under the influence of liquor,
appropriated a sum of money, was excused because she did not have
the required animus furandi.
These cases go to show that it is true that intoxication is not an
excuse but is important evidence to establish the lack of a material
element in certain crimes. Similarly, Glanville Williams suggests that
although no judge has said that drunkenness can negative reckless-
ness, it would follow from the above principles.30
As it can be seen, the words "specific intent" are not precise and
beg definition. H. A. Snelling in a recent article suggests a meaning:31
"It now appears reasonably clear that the phrase 'specific intent'
refers merely to some intent of a recognized character required by
statute or common law as an essential element of a crime whether or
not such intent needs to be referred to in the formulation of the charge
in the indictment"
This view attempts to give one an appreciation of the proper mean-
ing of the words "specific intent" and is useful for that purpose.
In the light of the above discussion, Lord Birkenhead's third
proposition is really a corollary to the second proposition in that it
really describes what degree of drunkenness is not sufficient to rebut
the specific intent in the second proposition.
25 [1909] 1 K.B. 895; 78 L.J.K.B. 476 (K.B.D.).26 Supra footnote 17.
27 [1949] 1 All E.R. 398; 1 K.B. 377 (K.B.D.).2 8 3But consider section 269 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code.
29 (1957), 41 Cr. App. R. 208.3 0 Supra footnote la at p. 379.
31 -. A. Snelling, Drunkenness and Criminal Responsibility, (1956-59),
30 Aust. L.J. 3.
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Up to this point, the defense has been examined with regard to
the subjective intent of the particular accused. There are, however,
circumstances where the mental element is not looked at subjectively,
but objectively. In this type of situation, the mental element of the
particular accused is irrelevant. What is relevant is what is known
as the "reasonable man" test. The test is basically: what would a
reasonable man do or intend in these particular circumstances? Or,
how would a reasonable man react in these circumstances? The con-
duct of the accused is evaluated by reference to the reasonable man.
The objective test is of use in considering the defense of provo-
cation. This defense is applicable to reduce murder to manslaughter
in the situation where the accused was provoked by his victim and
the provocation was such that it would cause an ordinary person to
lose his self-control. The effect of the drunkenness of the accused on
the defense of provocation has had an interesting but somewhat un-
explainable result in the English Courts. Since only that amount of
provocation that would cause an ordinary man to lose his self-control,
will excuse, of necessity, it is submitted that the drunkenness of the
accused is irrelevant to the determination of this objective question.
However, the English cases on this point do not reflect this submis-
Sion.
In the case of R. v. Thoma, 32 Parke B. took the view that drunk-
enness can be considered in determining the question of provocation.
In his direction to the jury, His Lordship said:
"Drunkenness may be taken into consideration in cases where what the
law deems sufficient provocation has been given, because the question
Is, in such cases, whether the fatal act is to be attributed to the passion
of anger excited by the previous provocation, and that passion is more
easily excitable in a person when in a state of intoxication than when
he is sober".
In R. v. Birha1,433 the Court of Criminal Appeal took the same
view.
Similarly, the case of B. v. Letenock34 determined that provo-
cation may be less, in order to reduce murder to manslaughter, in
the case of a drunken than a sober man.
The ability of the defense of provocation to reduce murder to
manslaughter is dealt with by section 203 of the Canadian Criminal
Code. Section 203(2) which defines provocation, reads as follows:
"(2) A wrongful act or insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient
to deprive an ordinary verson of the power of self-control is provocation
for the purposes of this section if the accused acted upon it on the sud-
den and before there was time for his passion to cool'. (Italics mine.)
The Code clearly states that only the provocation that will cause a
reasonabZe man to lose his self-control will reduce a charge of mur-
32 (1837), 7 Car. & P. 817; 173 E.R. 356.
33 (1913), 29 T.L.R. 711.
34 (1917), 12 Cr. App. R. 221.
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der to manslaughter. This may, therefore, be in conflict with the
English cases where drunkenness was taken into account in assessing
provocation. To date, there have been no cases decided under this
section where the accused claimed that he was more easily provoked
because of his drunken condition. Therefore, it is difficult to predict
which way our Courts will go in deciding this question.
It is submitted that drunkenness should not be taken into con-
sideration in deciding the question of provocation. The test for de-
termining provocation is objective and as a result, the intoxication
of the accused is irrelevant on the issue of provocation. This does not
mean that whenever the accused sets up the defense of provocation,
that he cannot also set up the defense of drunkenness as well. If
both defenses are available to him, he can rely on both, but the de-
fenses are separate and distinct and the presiding judge must direct
the jury to that end.a5
This paper would not be complete without reference to the recent
decision of the House of Lords in the case of the Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith.3 6 The result of this case is to apply the objec-
tive test when determining mens rea (the mental element) in the
case of murder rather than the subjective test. The accused who was
seated in a car containing stolen goods was told to pull over by a
police officer. In attempting to escape he brought about the death of
the police officer who had caught hold of the car, by driving at speeds
between 30 and 60 miles per hour and swerving violently. In his de-
fense the accused claimed that he did not intend to kill the police
officer or do him harm but only wanted to shake him off. The ac-
cused's conviction of murder was confirmed by the House of Lords,
reversing the Court of Criminal Appeal. The judgment of the Court
was written by Viscount Kilmuir L.C.; Lords Denning, Tucker, God-
dard and Parker concurring.
On the question of the requisite mental element, His Lordship
said: 37
"The jury must of course in such a case as the present make up their
minds on the evidence whether the accused was unlawfully and volun-
tarily doing something to someone. The unlawful and voluntary act
must clearly be aimed at someone in order to eliminate cases of negli-
gence or of careless or dangerous driving. Once, however, the jury are
satisfied as to that, it matters not what the accused in fact contem-
plated as the probable result, or whether he ever contemplated at all,
provided he was in law responsible and accountable for his actions, i.e.,
was a man capable of forming an intent, not insane within the M'Naghten
Rules and not suffering from diminished responsibility. On the assump-
tion that he is so accountable for his actions, the sole question is
whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous
bodily harm was the natural and probable result. The only test available
for this is what the ordinary, responsible man would, in all the circum-
stances of the case, have contemplated as the natural and probable re-
sult. That, indeed, has always been the law... ".
35 AbeZ v. B. (1955), 115 C.C.C. :119. (Que. Ct. of Q.B., Appeal Side).
36 [1960J 3 All E.R. 161.
37 Supra footnote 36 at p. 167.
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If the above test is regarded as completely objective in the case
where the unlawful act is "aimed" at another, then the particular
mental idiosyncrasies of the accused are entirely irrelevant. It is
only necessary to show that the act was aimed at the other party and
if grievous bodily harm could be contemplated by a "reasonable man"
as the natural and probable result of the wrongful act, the accused
is guilty of murder, the necessary "intent" being satisfied.
However, His Lordship introduced an important proviso to this
"objective test". The objective test is only to be used if the accused
was in law responsible for his actions; whether he was, as His Lord-
ship says: 38
" . . . a man capable of forming an intent, not insane within the
M'Naghten Rules and not suffering from diminished responsibility".
This proviso requires an appraisal of the accused's competence from
a subjective point of view i.e., whether this particular accused was
in fact. legally responsible. If so, then the objective test is used. If
this proviso is limited only to the case where the accused is insane
(not of sound mind) as the headnote and, to a certain extent, the
proviso, itself implies, then evidence of drunkenness is admissible to
show that it has caused actual insanity (delirium tremens) within
the McNaghten Rules. Should insanity be found, permanent or temp-
orary, the objective test would not be applicable.
However, the words of the proviso also require that the accused
be "a man capable of forming an intent". These words give rise to
further difficulty when one attempts to apply the law relating to
drunkenness. Although, the inebriate may not be capable of forming
a specific intent, he may be still capable of forming the requisite in-
tent for the lesser offence. Therefore, by being "capable of forming
an intent"- (italics mine), the inebriate may be regarded as being a
man in law responsible and accountable for his actions. If so, he could
not escape the proviso and his "intent" would be determined by using
the objective test.
On the other hand, the words "a man capable of forming an
intent" may be read as, "a man capable of forming a sp.ocific intent".
Then, it would follow that an inebriate who was incapable of forming
a specific intent, would not be responsible and accountable for his ac-
tions and the objective test would not apply to determine his "intent".
In Canada, the crime of murder is dealt with in section 201 of
the Criminal Code. Paragraph (c) of section 201 reads as follows:
"Culpable homicide is murder... (c) where a person, for an unlawful
object, does anything that he knows or ought to know Is likely to
cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being, notwithstand-
ing that he desires to effect his object without causing death or bodily
harm to any human being" (Italics mine).
This paragraph contains a built-in objective test and would apply
to the factual situation in the Smith Case and produce the same
38 Supra footnote 37.
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result It would appear that the question of the drunkenness of the
accused as a defence under this paragraph of section 201 would be
irrelevant.
Paragraph (a) of the same section requires further considera-
tion. It reads as follows:
"Culpable homicide is murder (a) where the person who causes thedeath of a human being (i) means to cause his death, or (ii) means to
cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, andis reckless whether death ensues or not".
This paragraph of section 201 requires the subjective intent of the
accused to be proven, and that is clear by sub-paragraph (i). With
regard to sub-paragraph (ii), the pronouncement of Viscount Kil-
muir L.C. may have a great effect, if followed in Canada. The word
"knows" in section 201(a) (ii) may receive the same objective treat-
ment that was established in the Smit case. That is to say, if one
"aims" an unlawful act at another and causes him "bodily harm",
the accused may be attributed with the knowledge that "an ordinary
responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the case, have con-
templated as the natural and probable result". A similar result when
applying the defense of drunkenness, as suggested above, would:fol-
low.
It is readily apparent that the strict rule that drunkenness is
never an excuse for a crime is now subject to qualification. It has
been seen that involuntary drunkenness is a complete excuse although
its appearance in practice is very rare. Insanity, permanent and tehp-
orary, if caused by excessive consumption of liquor is also a complete
excuse. Voluntary drunkenness may provide a complete answer to a
charge where it is such as to prevent the formation of the intent
specified, e.g., in theft. Further, it may provide a partial defense by
reducing an aggravated offence requiring" specific intent to a lesser
offence when the accused was unable to form the specific intent. In
this case, however, the rule is open to objection because it can apply
only to a restricted number of charges and, furthermore, the term
"specific intent" is incapable of precise definition. Certain situations
appear to be fitted into the slot of "specific intent" only by way of an
informed intuition on the part of the judges. Nor is the defense-free
from theoretical inconsistency as the cases on provocation show.
This field requires serious judicial analysis and clarification.39
DONALD N. SYNOWICKI
39 The effect of intoxication on the question of mistake has not been dealt
with in this paper. It is submitted that this question would be more properly
dealt with in a separate paper on mistake.
*Mr. Synowicki is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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